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The influence of Unions on Companies’ CSR profiles:
More Internal Policies and Programs, but not always at
the expense of External Endeavors.
Muhammad Umar Boodoo ∗
London School of Economics and Political Science
ABSTRACT
This paper compares the CSR profiles of companies operating under the same macroeconomic
institutions but with different levels of union density. Drawing from stakeholder and
neo-institutional theories that distinguish between internal and external actions, this paper finds
that companies initially have to substitute internal for external CSR. After some experience
dealing with unions, companies can complement both actions. There is perhaps a reinforcement
of mutual trust and loyalty, and has implications for managerial prerogatives.
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Unions, Stakeholder theory
∗I acknowledge the support from SustainAlytics, which provided me with the main data to undertake this analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
The spread of voluntary corporate initiatives in the environmental, social, and governance
domains - commonly referred to as “corporate social responsibility (CSR)” - can be attributed to
increased institutional and social pressures for ethical, responsible, and sustainable business
practices (Carroll (1979); Aupperle (1991); Campbell (2007); Waddock (2008)). Firms can
respond to such pressures by taking actions that are visible to its external stakeholders (e.g
investors, consumers) via better disclosure practices, branding, low involvement with ‘sinful’
industries, and improved product quality control. They can also take internal actions that are most
salient to internal stakeholders (e.g. employees). Such actions can be in the form of setting up
conditions and work environments that foster health and safety. The scope of CSR activities that a
company may undertake can, therefore, affect multiple stakeholders both inside and outside the
firm, and it has been shown that a wider gap between internal and external actions, one reflecting
more “talk” and less “action” by firms, negatively affects financial performance (Hawn and
Iaonnou (2016)). The latter in addition to other studies done over the last decade point to the
multitude benefits of engaging in CSR. Indeed, a meta-analysis by Margolis et al. (2007) suggests
a significant positive link between CSR and firm financial performance. While a big section of the
literature on CSR has been populated with studies that have related social performance to
financial performance, there still remains a relative paucity of papers with regards to the
interaction between stakeholder demand and corporate supply of CSR. In other words, the link
between the various types of CSR that a firm can enact and the particular stakeholder motivation
or pressure (or simply the desire to improve corporate image) that leads to such CSR has not been
well established. The gaps are both theoretical and empirical.
Consider, specifically, the case of employees as a stakeholder group. Do they have enough
power internally - or can they draw sufficient attention to the company - such that their
employment rights are upheld in the most suitable manner? Can they, as a stakeholder, pressure
the company to mend and improve its health and safety procedures? Can they force the company
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to indulge in practices that are also beneficial to society and to the environment? From the
corporate point of view, do firms view CSR as a vehicle for better employment relations, better
hiring and retention, better reputation building? Such interaction of stakeholder demand and
corporate supply is missing in the CSR field, largely because CSR is still a burgeoning field and
the spread of and benefits to CSR have only recently become apparent.
This study delves into this important issue by examining whether stakeholder demand and
stakeholder pressure influences the CSR profile of a company. It is done in a CSR setting for a
number of reasons. First, CSR incorporates many of the attributes that stakeholders desire and
lobby for. Such attributes may be internal to the company but may also be external, suggesting a
positive externality accruing to other related or non-related stakeholder groups. Second, we know
that CSR profiles vary by country, by industry, but also by company. Most of the work in
comparative CSR has tended to look at the effect or influence of country-level institutions on CSR
differences across countries, with little emphasis on individual corporate constraints (e.g. Iaonnou
and Serafeim (2012); Bluhm and Trappmann (2012); Williams and Aguilera (2008)). Some
emerging literature have incorporated individual company variables, but the latter mostly revolve
around financial resources (e.g. Gomez and Verma (2012); Hawn and Iaonnou (2016)). The
stakeholder power/pressure aspect has not been explored in the literature, especially from an
empirical perspective. Third, despite the best efforts of the company and its stakeholders to
monitor and deliver best practices, accidents and controversies happen. In such cases, it would be
important to know how the interplay and prior relationship between stakeholders and the
company are able to help manage the situation and work out solutions to avoid such problems.
The main theoretical focus of this paper is the interplay of stakeholder pressure and corporate
delivery of CSR. Stakeholder theory (e.g. Freeman (1984)) and neo-institutional theory (e.g.
DiMaggio and Powell (1991)) are the main driving factors that guide this discussion. I take the
view that companies want to meet the demands of their relevant stakeholders (consumers,
suppliers, investors, employees). Further, drawing from neo-institutional theory, I posit that
higher stakeholder power increases the company’s self regulation and leads to the firm
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institutionalizing best practices within the firm (internal CSR) and outside (external CSR). In
particular, this paper looks at the role of trade unions in the British context. The British context of
employment relations (in the private sector) probably offers the best setting to study this question
because unions have not been eroded via anti-union legislation such as in the United States, and
unions are not institutionalized such as in continental European countries. Instead, unions can
(freely) organize bargaining units within individual firms (Metcalf (2003); Hyman (2010)), and
this allows for a comparison between heavily-unionized firms and lesser-unionized firms to be
able to characterize this interplay between stakeholder (union) pressure and idiosyncratic
corporate delivery of CSR.
To test the theoretical predictions, I use an originally-crafted dataset on CSR from
SustainAlytics. Financial data are added from DataStream to create a longitudinal sample of firms
listed on the FTSE100 index, one of the main market indices in the United Kingdom. Using
fixed-effects estimation techniques, this paper finds that in a similar institutional context, higher
union density is associated with more internal CSR. Firms listed on the FTSE100 that have a
higher union density create more policies and programs that are geared towards improving
employee relations, even though this relationship is statistically weak. On the other hand, external
CSR performance and union density are related in a U-shaped manner, implying that as union
density picks up, companies initially have to “sacrifice” external CSR in order to meet the
demands of unions. However, after a certain threshold of unionization, firms are able to invest in
policies and programs that are more directly related to external stakeholders as well as meet the
demands of employees and unions. As such, overall, this paper finds that the difference between
internal and external CSR is positively related to union density but at a diminishing rate. At low
levels of unionization, companies have to substitute internal for external CSR, but as unions
become more entrenched and management becomes experienced in terms of dealing with unions,
the company is able to simultaneously do both internal and external CSR. This is analogous to the
economies of scale hypothesis although in this context it is in a much more positive tone given
that more unions actually relates to better (external) social performance.
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This paper makes at least three contributions to the literature on CSR, and the impact of
stakeholders on CSR profiles. First, from a theoretical point of view, although there have been
many papers that have looked at institutional differences among countries leading to different
CSR practices, there have been very few that have taken an inside look at the corporation, in
particular with regards to its key internal and external stakeholders. The industrial relations
literature and other literatures are ripe in terms of the influence of unions on R&D (Hirsch
(1992)), innovation (Bradley et al. (2015)), and profitability and share value (Ruback and
Zimmerman (1984); Abowd (1989); Lee and Mas (2012)). This paper, to the author’s knowledge,
is the first to look at the influence of unions on corporate social performance. Second, this paper
adds a layer of complexity not studied before in the comparative CSR literature. While most
papers that deal with comparative CSR ignore within-country idiosyncratic company differences,
this paper proposes that these differences are important and play a significant role in explaining
individual company responses to CSR at the lowest micro level of analysis. As such, future
papers in the comparative CSR sphere could or should exploit these differences as well. Third,
from an empirical perspective, this paper adds to a debate that has emerged in the literature about
the substitutability or complementarity between internal and external CSR. On the one hand,
Matten and Moon (2008) argue that there may be a substitution that is necessary between implicit
elements of CSR (e.g. bounded by rules and regulations such as collective bargaining) and explicit
elements (such as social community involvement and support). On the other hand, Gjolberg
(2009) argue that they are complements. The findings of this paper, much more robust and much
closer to the corporate stakeholder approach and not limited to using national proxies for
collective bargaining strength, suggest that both are at play. At low levels of power exercised by
internal stakeholders, substitution takes place, whereas at higher levels, there is complementarity.
A finding which has interesting implications for management and perhaps union renewal debates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical lenses through
which union influence on CSR will be analyzed and develops some testable hypotheses. Section 3
describes the data and methodology that will be used to test the hypotheses. Section 4 details the
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results of the paper while Section 5 leads the discussions and concludes.
STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE DECISIONS
CSR proponents offer a somewhat more enlightened view of how firms achieve competitive
advantage as opposed to neo-classical economists. The latter consider CSR to be an agency loss;
managers pursue CSR for personal gain, not shareholder benefit (Friedman (1970)). This notion
of agency loss is based on the definition of CSR in (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001, p.117): “we
define CSR as actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and
that which is required by law”. Under this narrow definition of CSR, it is not surprising to come
across notions of agency problems when discussing CSR. Proponents of CSR, however, argue
that acting in a pro-social manner is actually in the firms’ best interests. Stakeholder theory
(Freeman (1984)), the cornerstone of the business case for CSR, highlights the importance of a
firm’s relationships with a broader set of individuals and organizations, beyond just shareholders.
Instrumental stakeholder theory (Jones (1995) further clarifies how CSR contributes to the
bottom line via its favourable influence on the firm’s relationships with important stakeholders.
The importance of stakeholders can be determined by their relative power, legitimacy, and
urgency (Mitchell et al. (1997)). The overall logic is that CSR (e.g., generous giving to the
community) increases the trustworthiness of a firm and strengthens relationships with important
stakeholders (e.g., increases employee satisfaction), which decreases transaction costs and,
therefore, leads to financial gain (e.g., decreased employee turnover and more eager talent pool).
Such evidence is presented in earlier research such as Dutton et al. (1994); Brekke and Nyborg
(2004). Neo-institutional theory posits, amongst other things, that firms strategically undertake
two types of actions to meet institutional pressures and gain legitimacy. One type of action is
internally focused such as through structural mimicry adopting best practices seen elsewhere, and
another type is externally focused which seeks to gain legitimacy from external constituents (Sine
et al. (2007); McDonnell and King (2013)). This distinction between internally- and
externally-focused actions is analogous to the distinction between internal and external
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stakeholders which results mainly from stakeholder theory.
Unions as a stakeholder
One of the most powerful and legitimate stakeholders of a company is its labor unions (assuming
there is at least one). How does one analyze the relationship between unions and CSR? A
convenient place to start is to consider how European unions view CSR. In Europe, the industrial
relations system is such that unions are heavily institutionalized (and protected) within the
system. Research by Preuss et al. (2006) suggests five possible union responses to CSR, with
most of the unions citing CSR as a threat since it transfers more power and discretion to
managers. One of five possibilities that is discussed is that CSR is only a method to improving
corporate image (to external stakeholders) while diverting attention from other less popular
actions (typically towards internal stakeholders such as employees). This may indeed be true in
both the U.S. case as well as the British case, where in the private sector unions are typically
weaker than their European counterparts. At the same time, European unions do emphasize that
there are some aspects of CSR that they find appealing. For example, (AKAVA, 2001, p. 1), a
Finnish union for academic professionals suggests that: “CSR has many aspects, like welfare of
personnel, ability to cope and safety at work, promoting equality and diversity, preventing
discrimination, promoting lifelong learning, and management of change due to restructuring and
ageing employees. These all have a direct impact in staff motivation and productivity”.
Overall, Preuss et al. (2006) finds that unsurprisingly unions emphasize the internal actions of
CSR more than the external actions. Unions, for example, emphasize improved work-life balance,
better child care facilities, flexible working arrangements. Another element that unions emphasize
is that corporations anticipate industrial change and minimize the negative consequences on
personnel due to restructuring. However, unions are less interested in company-external elements.
Few unions in the research by Preuss et al. (2006) mention corporate community involvement,
and even fewer unions are interested in the preservation of the natural environment. Overall,
company-internal aspects of CSR dominate the CSR agenda of European unions, which are
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largely institutionalized. This begs the question: in a country like the UK, where unions have not
been stifled through anti-union legislation, and where unions are not institutionalized but rather
free to organize within individual companies, how does the CSR profile of companies look like or
differ contingent on their degree of unionization? Do heavily-unionized firms tilt more towards
internal aspects of CSR, as opposed to external aspects? This certainly seems to be plausible
given the European findings from the interviews in Preuss et al. (2006).
Hypotheses
Despite the fact that CSR has been shown to be positively related to firm value (e.g. Margolis
et al. (2007)), CSR remains a costly endeavour (Gomez and Verma (2012)). Further, Hawn and
Iaonnou (2016) suggest that firms do not undertake both internal and external actions
simultaneously. Few firms seek to “walk the talk”, i.e. internally improve their structures and
employment relations systems, along with appeasing external constituents with community giving
and other socio-environmental programs. Given that unions prefer to focus the CSR of their
parent firm on internal aspects (Preuss et al. (2006)), I expect that in the British context, where
unions are free to organize and bargain, they will press the company towards higher internal
actions relative to external ones. In other words, the gap between external and internal actions will
be lower in firms that are heavily unionized (i.e. complements) relative to firms that have fewer
unions (i.e. substitutes). This is because unions are very much a stakeholder that have power,
legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell et al. (1997)). I, therefore formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Companies with higher union densities develop more internal policies and
programs of CSR relative to companies with lower rates of unionization
Hypothesis 2. Companies with higher union densities develop less external policies and
programs of CSR relative to companies with lower rates of unionization
In order to really capture the influence of unions on internal and external CSR, the direction of
influence is not the only consideration. A quadratic functional form of union density may also be
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considered to get a better picture of how unions are affecting the CSR profile of their parent
company. Given the stakeholder typology developed by Mitchell et al. (1997) that assigns
stakeholders on the basis of power, legitimacy, and urgency, I posit that higher union densities put
more pressure on companies to meet union demands in an urgent manner such that the internal
CSR score of companies rises at an increasing rate with union density. At the same time, with
CSR being costly and companies not engaging in both internal and external CSR at the same rate,
unions may hinder the external CSR profile, given that larger unions have more power and
urgency and pose a credible threat to the operations of the company, especially in a relationship of
labour-management conflict such as in the UK. I posit the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3. Companies with higher union densities develop internal policies and programs
at an increasing rate relative to companies with lower rates of unionization. The curvilinear
relationship between internal performance and union density is convex
Hypothesis 4. Companies with higher union densities develop external policies and
programs at a diminishing rate relative to companies with lower rates of unionization. The
curvilinear relationship between external performance and union density is convex
Combining the above hypotheses allows to develop a further hypothesis with regards to the
difference between internal and external CSR and degree of unionization. Given the curvilinear
relationships expected, I would expect that the difference between internal and external CSR and
its relationship to unionization will be positive and convex. That is, more and rapid expansion of
internal policies and programs at the expense of external actions. The relationship is not expected
to be zero because it has been shown in the literature that companies will always strive to
maintain some level of external CSR due to branding, corporate image, and increasingly the
positive effect on market value and Tobin’s Q (Hawn and Iaonnou (2016)).1
1The focus by Hawn and Iaonnou (2016) is on the difference between internal and external CSR only; they do not
show results for internal and external CSR respectively.
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Hypothesis 5. The relationship between unionization and the difference between the internal
and external CSR scores is positive and convex implying greater and more rapid expansion of
internal policies and programs at the expense of external actions
Managers and investors in particular may be interested in the opposite relation: how does the
difference between internal and external CSR affect firm value? This was the main question
exposited in Hawn and Iaonnou (2016). The main crux of the argument they make is that
companies need to “walk the talk” and complement external CSR approaches with internal
structures and policies that support those activities. They find that differences between external
and internal CSR lead to lower firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. While the focus of their
paper is different to the stakeholder power, legitimacy, and urgency approach of this paper, it is
still beneficial to estimate this relationship, because it is of interest to a broader group of
stakeholders. Both internal and external actions would contribute to higher firm value in this light,
and for at least two reasons: a) each set of actions improves firm legitimacy, and b) they reduce
information asymmetry between the firm and the investor community, some of whom (e.g.
pension funds, and other ethical investors) may be interested in the CSR profile of the company
they invest in (Cheng et al. (2014); Hawn et al. (2014)). Just like Hawn and Iaonnou (2016), I
expect to find that larger differences between external and internal CSR are associated with lower
firm value.
Hypothesis 6. Larger differences between internal and external CSR scores are related to
lower firm value
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Sample and data collection
The sample is constructed from a number of databases. The CSR data for this study were
provided directly by SustainAlytics, a global leader in sustainability reporting and
Environment-Social-Governance (ESG) metrics. The primary objective of SustainAlytics, it
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should be noted, is to provide reliable and comparable information to investors who want to
integrate ethical and other social issues into their investment strategy and portfolio. For example,
pension funds are often mandated to include CSR in their due diligence process of portfolio
decisions. Analysts working for SustainAlytics collect raw data from company reports and other
third-party reports (e.g. unions, NGOs, government and Stock Exchange documents) and
standardize them into consistent units so that they can arrive at final scores that are comparable
across companies. Usually, these scores are at three levels: 1) Environmental, 2) Social, and 3)
Governance, and each firm is scored and ranked on a monthly basis relative to a comparable peer
group. For example, oil and gas companies would typically be lower in terms of their environment
score, as a result of which they cannot be compared to banks and other financial institutions.
Rather, SustainAlytics analysts rank companies on a peer-group basis, where companies in similar
‘baskets’ of ESG are pooled together. This idiosyncracy is not a problem for this paper because I
will be using SustainAlytics’ raw scores and industry controls to create my own measures.
ESG data is divided into its three components and each component is then further subdivided
into several subcomponents (see Figure 1 for the categories employed by SustainAlytics). For the
purpose of this study, I will focus only on the social theme, and its three subcomponents because
it is not clear which aspects of governance and environment apply more to internal or external
stakeholders. The theoretical approach in Hawn and Iaonnou (2016) is mostly neo-institutional
theories and they do consider some aspects such as “percentage of women on the Board of
Directors” as internal CSR. However, given that the main theoretical driver of this paper is
stakeholder theory, I cannot do that. Percentage of women on the Board of Directors may be
appealing to internal stakeholders such as management and labour, but it may also be appealing to
investors and potential investors who may view women as more ethical in their business conduct.
Similarly, programs to reduce water and energy usage is viewed as an aspect of internal CSR in
Hawn and Iaonnou (2016), which may be of interest to employee morale, but it may be of more
interest to environmental stakeholders, the media, and other external stakeholders including
“green” investors. In other words, I take the view that governance and environment are noisier
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measures of internal and external CSR, and social is clearer given that SustainAlytics can
delineate between CSR that affects employees (internal stakeholders), and suppliers, clients and
the community (external stakeholders).2 Internal CSR will, therefore, consist of elements of CSR
that fall under the category ‘employees’, whereas external CSR will comprise of CSR elements
that pertain mostly to suppliers, clients, and society, local communities and philanthropy. To give
a couple of examples, under internal CSR, items such as policies with regards to health and
safety, work-life balance are considered. For external, items such as policy on certifying
suppliers, programs to increase purchase fair-trade materials, community engagement programs
are used. Each item is scored out of 100, whereby best performance is 100, next best would be 75
or 50, and so on until the company scores 0 for an item where it fails considerably. In total, the
data contains 14 items that make up the internal score (15 - 1(degree of unionization)), and 43
items that make up the external score. Degree of unionization is left out and is used separately as
an explanatory variable.
————————————
Insert FIGURE 1 about here.
————————————
Financial data are obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream database. In particular, the
items used are size (market value), profitability (return on equity), opportunistic value or potential
of the firm (calculated as Tobin’s Q), liquidity position (calculated as quick ratio). The final
sample includes 1190 observations, an unbalanced panel with 96 unique firms from the FTSE100
during the period 2009-2013 (divided into quarters, with 1 quarter in 2009, and full quarters from
2010 to 2013, i.e. a total of 17 time periods). Note that the independent variables will be lagged
by 1 quarter.
2The summary statistics will nonetheless include the SustainAlytics measures of total, governance, social, and
environment scores.
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Dependent variables
Both of the CSR scores (i.e. internal and external) are obtained by totalling the scores for all of
their respective items, and this is done for each company i at time t. Note that SustainAlytics
usually uses a proprietary weighting standard to score and rank companies contingent on industry
(or peer group) belonging. However, I will not use this approach for this study because I have no
method to validate or invalidate their proprietary weighting standard. Instead each item that forms
the internal CSR score and each item that forms the external CSR score will be assigned equal
weight. This follows the convention in the literature from Waddock and Graves (1997); Hillman
and Keim (2001); Iaonnou and Serafeim (2012) and others. Nonetheless, the scores may still be
heavily tilted in terms of industry dependence (e.g. certain industries may have more supply chain
monitoring issues in general), and therefore, relative standardized scores are then calculated for
each of internal and external CSR with respect to an industry j benchmark at time t.
RelCSRscoreit =
CSRTotalit −Min(CSRTotal jt)
Max(CSRTotal jt)−Min(CSRTotal jt) (1)
where CSR refers to any one of Internal (INT) or External (EXT) CSR score. This method also
allows to bound the measures between 0 and 1, and make interpretations more standard, as per
Baron (2009).
Independent variables
With regards to independent variables, union density, as provided by SustainAlytics is used.
Some companies have zero unions and, therefore zero union density. Natural logarithmic
transformation is applied to market value given the large variation in the data, while the other
variables (Return on Equity, Quick Ratio, and Tobin’s Q) are kept the same.
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Econometric specification
With the unbalanced panel of 96 firms observed over 17 quarters and to test the aforementioned
hypotheses, I adapt a specification that has been used in the CSR literature by Baron (2009) and
Iaonnou and Serafeim (2014). Equation 2 gives the specification that will be used in this analysis.
RelCSRscoreit = αi +β0 +β1QuickRatioit−1 +β2 lnMarketValueit−1+
β3ReturnonEquityit−1 +β4UnionDensityit−1 +β6UnionDensitySquaredit−1 + εit (2)
where RelCSRscoreit can be either Internal or External CSR score of company i at time t or the
difference between the Internal and External CSR scores.3. Equation 2 is estimated using the
fixed effects methodology, as a result of which industry controls are not used. Random effects
were used as a check but a Hausmann test suggested that fixed effects estimation will produce
more consistent results (p-value of test was around 0.03).
RESULTS
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest. The means, standard
deviations, minimums and maximums are shown both across firms and within firms. The
summary statistics reveal that there is quite a large variation in the data, whether it be the scores
provided by SustainAlytics, or my calculated internal and external CSR scores. The same
observation holds for the independent variables as well. Overall, most of the variation happens
across firms rather than within firms. However, the variations within are substantial enough to
warrant the use of fixed effect modelling. The results that follow will control for these variations
by clustering standard errors at the firm level. Note that calculating standard errors for 96 clusters
greatly reduces the degrees of freedom of the models and reduces the significance of many
3I also use the scores provided by SustainAlytics (i.e. Total, Environment, Social, Governance) but these are much
more noisy than the measures I am using given it is not clear what components of Governance for instance matter
most to internal rather than external stakeholders. Also, the weights used by SustainAlytics is proprietary and serves
towards purposes of ranking companies: not an objective of this study
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variables. Separate results (not shown) using White’s method of controlling for heteroskedasticity
show qualitatively similar results but the levels of significance of some variables are higher.
Table 2 shows the pairwise correlations between the main variables of interest. Significance
levels are not shown but one observation about union density and company measures is that
unions tend to organize more in larger firms, as measured by market value. Also, and this goes in
line with Metcalf (2003), unions overall are associated with under-performing firms, as measured
by both the Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets. However, with regards to CSR, they do seem to be
associated with more socially responsible firms, across all dimensions and measures used.
Interestingly, the correlation between unions and internal CSR is much higher than the correlation
between unions and external CSR.
————————————
Insert TABLE 1 about here.
————————————
————————————
Insert TABLE 2 about here.
————————————
Table 3 presents the main regression results of estimating the internal CSR scores with
standard errors clustered at the firm level. Model 1 represents a basic model without the main
independent variable of interest: union density. The results show that firms that have a better
liquidity position (higher quick ratio) in period t−1 are able to score higher in their internal CSR
policies and programs given that they invest in more internal quality programs and monitoring.
Return on Equity in period t−1 is negatively correlated with internal CSR in period t. This is an
interesting finding, implying that companies that financially do poorly in a certain period will
increase the quality of their internal policies and programs in the next period. This is akin to the
“damage mitigation” hypothesis posited by Gomez and Verma (2012). Model 2 adds a linear
measure of union density, and we find that the previous observations remain (albeit return on
assets is insignificant) and that union density in period t−1 is positively related to internal CSR.
A 1 standard deviation increase in union density is associated with a 0.02 (obtained by
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multiplying the coefficient with the standard deviation of union density in Table 1) standard
deviation increase in internal CSR. Model 3 also adds the square term of union density in order to
capture non-linear trends of internal policies and programs as a function of union density. Results
show that there is no non-linear trend. Hypothesis 1 is, therefore, sustained while Hypothesis 3 is
rejected given that the relationship between internal CSR and unionization seems to be only
linear. In specifications that use White’s method of controlling for heteroskedasticity instead of
firm-level clustering of standard errors, the non-linearity is sustained even though the coefficient
on the quadratic term is negative, implying slower rate of expansion of internal programs and
policies as union density rises.
————————————
Insert TABLE 3 about here.
————————————
Table 4 presents the main regression results of estimating the external CSR scores with
standard errors clustered at the firm level. Model 1 again represents a basic model without the
main independent variable of interest: union density. The results show that Return on Equity in
period t−1 is positively correlated with external CSR in period t, going against the “damage
mitigation” hypothesis posited by Gomez and Verma (2012). Firms work more with suppliers,
clients, and the community when they perform better in the previous period. This result stands in
contrast to the result that is obtained when internal CSR is considered. Different corporate
approaches to CSR seem to be working here. When results are bad in a certain period, firms
invest more in internal CSR and less in external CSR in the next period. Perhaps, British firms
view CSR as a morale and productivity-boosting endeavour. The fact that liquidity position and
size and opportunistic value of the firm are not correlated with external CSR in a significant
manner also adds credence to the idea that (external) CSR is perhaps a marketing tool employed
to improve performance, rather than reflect past performance (the insurance hypothesis in Gomez
and Verma (2012)). Model 2 adds a linear measure of union density, and results show that union
density in period t−1 has no significant relationship to external CSR in period t. However, and as
Model 3 shows, this is because there is a very high non-linearity in the relationship between union
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density and external CSR. The linear effect of unions on external CSR is negative, implying that
there is a substitution effect that takes place. With unions, companies invest less in external CSR,
perhaps because they have to devote more resources to internal policies and programs, as argued
above in the results of internal CSR. However, this substitution is not binding. The high positive
on the square term suggests that substitution ends after some degree of unionization, and in fact
the trend reverses such that external CSR and internal CSR go hand-in-hand. In other words,
results show that there is both a substitution effect (Matten and Moon (2008)) and a complement
effect (Gjolberg (2009)) between internal and external CSR. Hypothesis 2 is, therefore, mildly
sustained while Hypothesis 4 is rejected given that the relationship between external CSR and
unionization is highly concave.
————————————
Insert TABLE 4 about here.
————————————
The relationship between unionization and the difference between internal and external CSR
scores can be looked at in a more coherent way from the results shown in Table 5, where the
dependent variable is ‘internal MINUS external’ scores. The three models follow the same
procedure as before, with unionization entering in phases. Model 2 suggests a positive
relationship between unionization and the difference between internal and external CSR, although
the result is statistically insignificant. When union density is entered in as a square term, the
results show that the difference increases with union density but only up to a point, after which
the reverse happens. A 1 standard deviation increase in union density is correlated with a gap of
0.0785 between internal and external CSR. External CSR picks up more pace so that the
difference reduces and even flips in favour of external CSR , given the size of the linear and
square-term coefficients. Hypothesis 5 is correct only to a certain extent, and it is, therefore,
rejected.
————————————
Insert TABLE 5 about here.
————————————
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Post-regression estimates of internal and external CSR scores as a function of union density
are shown in Figure 2. As can be seen, internal CSR scores rise with union density but at a
diminishing rate. Statistically, given the conservative methods used for estimating standard errors,
the observed effects are not significant. With regards to external CSR scores shown on the right
panel, we note that external CSR initially falls as union density starts to pick up, but after about
40% union density, the trend is reverse. External CSR picks up rather significantly. With regards
to the difference between internal and external CSR, there is quite much to observe from Figure 3.
First, the post-regression estimates, holding all else at their means, show that below 10%
unionization, companies invest more in external rather than internal policies and programs.
Between 12% to 90% unionization, the trend changes and companies score higher on internal
CSR rather than external CSR.
————————————
Insert FIGURE 2 about here.
————————————
More importantly, a further observation is that there are both substitution and complement
effects between internal and external CSR. Companies substitute internal for external CSR up to
union density levels of approximately 50%. The upward trend means that the difference between
internal and external CSR keeps growing as a function of union density, albeit at a diminishing
rate. After 50% unionization, internal and external CSR work in tandem. They complement each
other, and from Figure 2, we can attribute this to a sharp improvement in external policies and
programs. As such, the difference between the two measures falls, and quite dramatically too
given that external CSR goes beyond internal CSR after about 90% unionization.
————————————
Insert FIGURE 3 about here.
————————————
Finally, I also estimate the effect of the difference between internal and external CSR on firm
value, as measured by its Tobin’s Q. I use a similar approach to Hawn and Iaonnou (2016), and
carry out this analysis in order to show whether huge differences between internal and external
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CSR are detrimental to the firm, i.e. a firm that does not “walk the talk”. The results from Table 6
show that this is not the case, even if I do not control for union density.
————————————
Insert TABLE 6 about here.
————————————
Robustness checks
One of the interpretative concerns of the above results is that union density within firms can
change because of two factors, given that union density is measured as the ratio between
unionized employees and total number of employees. If we consider specifically the case where
union density is rising within firms, there could be two broad reasons for this. First, unions may
be getting better at organizing within firms over time. Second, firms may be shrinking in size and
total employment, where presumably non-union employees are being laid off rather than union
employees, who are generally better protected (Freeman and Medoff (1984)). As such, union
density rising may not necessarily mean that unions are getting better at organizing and at
(directly) influencing internal CSR, and the difference between internal and external CSR. It may
be the case that the company is shrinking in size, as a result of which union density is going up.
To consider this aspect, I estimate equation 2 and add the difference in firm size between times t
and t−1 as an independent variable. Size is here measured by total assets, rather than market
value, since it is more correlated with total number of employees at the firm level.4 This will help
control for firm size variations over time. If results are consistent with the earlier reported main
estimations, then the interpretation can be that union density is more closely measuring unions’
ability to organize and influence the CSR profile of companies. Table 7 reports the results when
difference in size is considered. Models 1 and 2 report results for internal CSR, with union
density entering as a linear term only in Model 1 and as a quadratic term in Model 2. The same
exposition is done for external CSR (Models 3 and 4), and difference between internal and
external CSR (Models 5 and 6).
4Note that I do not have total number of employees in my dataset, which is why I am using the size proxy.
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————————————
Insert TABLE 7 about here.
————————————
A comparison between the estimates in Table 7 and the earlier estimates in Tables 3, 4, and 5
show that the earlier results are robust to the inclusion of size difference within firms. While size
difference is significant in several specifications, the union density measures have not changed
much, both in terms of economic as well as statistical significance. Union influence on internal
and external CSR seems to be occurring because unions are better at organizing and/or better at
driving corporate policy.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In order to gain a better understanding of the stakeholder approach to CSR, it is critical to
investigate CSR as a good. On the one hand, who demands CSR, and on the other hand, how
much CSR can be supplied by a company? This paper uses the stakeholder approach (Freeman
(1984)) and a neo-institutional approach distinguishing between internal and external actions
(Jones (1995)) to investigate how unions wielding their power, urgency, and legitimacy as
stakeholders (Mitchell et al. (1997)) can affect the CSR profile of companies their members work
for.
In this endeavour, this paper has attempted to bridge a gap between two streams in the CSR
literature. As Bluhm and Trappmann (2012) point out, Matten and Moon (2008) propose that
there is a substitution effect between “implicit” CSR and “explicit” CSR, whereby some firms
generally devote more attention to following rules and regulations and maintain their image as
such, while other firms are more explicit in their CSR practices, often with outlandish community
and other social programs. Similarly, Gomez and Verma (2012) and Hawn and Iaonnou (2016)
point that CSR is costly and companies do not actually do both internal and external CSR
concurrently and at the same rate. The flip side comes from Bluhm and Trappmann (2012) and
Gjolberg (2009) who argue that in certain countries, internal and external CSR are actually
complements, and both serve to reinforce each other. The findings of this paper, which uses more
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detailed data and analyzes companies rather than country-wide averages mostly used in
cross-country comparisons of CSR, show that both elements of substitution and complementarity
are at work. A result that was mostly unexpected. At very low levels of unionization, companies
do more external than internal CSR, catering to the needs of outside stakeholders more than
internal stakeholders. Then, after approximately 10% unionization rate, companies start
substituting internal for external policies and programs and this substitution goes on, albeit at a
diminishing rate. However, unlike my initial prediction that this substitution goes on until
unionization reaches 100%, the trend actually reverses after unionization reaches approximately
50%. External CSR gathers pace and work more as a complement to internal CSR such that the
difference between the two narrows. More surprisingly, after 90% unionization, external CSR is
higher than internal CSR.
How can we explain these pointedly unexpected but interesting results? The literature on
strategic management and CSR may not be very helpful in this endeavour. However, the literature
from labour relations may help explain why we see the aforementioned results. First, Metcalf
(2003) points out that unions in the UK and USA have been shown to reduce investment in
physical capital but increase investment in human capital. This aspect of increasing investment in
human capital may extend to the CSR sphere but not necessarily in a narrow sense. It is possible
that part of collective agreements and union pressure incentivizes or forces companies to invest in
human capital inside but also outside the firm, through educational grants, health care grants, and
other donations to the community (external stakeholders). This could be an explanation that could
help understand why external CSR goes up after approximately 40 % unionization rate. Unions
could achieve this through negotiations but also through their role of monitoring work. For
example, Pencavel (1977) emphasizes the role that unions may play in overseeing work
performance given that they are in a position of high power and have been allowed to disseminate
work payments to workers. A trust-based relationship between management and labour could be
at the core of why we see high external CSR when union density goes up. At low levels of
unionization, management may have to deal with the shock factor of having to deal with a few
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unions while maintaining fairness across the board. Metcalf (2003) terms this the shock effect of
unionization, where management may have to initially “sacrifice” external CSR to deal with
smaller levels of unionization. More importantly, Freeman and Medoff (1984) proposes that
managerial responses to unionism take the form of more rational personnel policies such as lean
production techniques and more careful monitoring of work, which reduces organizational slack.
As such, it is possible that more rational personnel policies are leaving resources on the table,
which the company is shielding from unions and giving to external stakeholders in the guise of
external policies and programs. These would explain why we initially see a substitution effect
between internal and external CSR and how the gap eventually narrows down such that both are
complements given the trust and streamlining (productivity gains) that may take place.
One of the most surprising results is that at the highest levels of unionization (90% and above),
the complementarity between internal and external CSR continues to the extent where external
CSR is higher than internal CSR. I can attribute this finding to the following. First, as Metcalf
(2003) suggests, union presence sometimes results in adversarial style of industrial relations,
lowering trust and cooperation. This is certainly true for the UK (Hyman (2010)). At very high
levels of unionization, the power struggle between union and management could be severe enough
such that management focuses more towards earning warm glow from external stakeholders by
investing massively in external CSR while unions battle management for legitimacy. This point
was made by Freeman and Medoff (1984), whose argument is that for productivity to rise at the
company level, there must be good industrial relations, where the profits can be increased. If
industrial relations are poor, then common goals between labour and management will be ignored
where each actor may set goals that go against the interests of the company. Further, the
relationship between union and management may get even worse if there are multiple unions
within the organization. This last point by Freeman and Medoff (1984) bears some resemblance to
the CSR sphere here. At 90% or higher levels of unionization, it is highly likely that management
is dealing with multiple unions. The relationship and political fights between management and
unions, and between unions themselves may get so costly that management and unions lose trust
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in each other and each prefer to follow their individual rather than collective goals. This could
explain why after 90% unionization, external CSR goes above internal CSR: management is
interested in embracing more external stakeholders to build support against unions, which it does
not trust and which it finds very difficult to work with. Political explanations are possible.
From a managerial perspective, the results show that large difference between internal and
external CSR may be detrimental to firm value. This goes in line with Hawn and Iaonnou (2016)
and further adds credence to neo-institutional theorists’ view that both internal and external
actions need to corroborate for results to be effective.
In conclusion, this paper has demonstrated that unions using their power, urgency and
legitimacy can influence a company’s CSR profile. Companies initially have to substitute internal
for external CSR, but after some experience with dealing with unions, they can do both together.
There is perhaps a reinforcement of mutual trust and loyalty. Both are important from a policy
perspective but also from a managerial and shareholder perspective, because both likely are
associated with higher firm value.
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FIGURE 1: ESG categories from SustainAlytics
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FIGURE 2: Estimated Internal and External CSR scores, by union density
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FIGURE 3: Estimated difference between Internal and External CSR scores, by union density
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TABLE 1: Summary statistics for main variables of interest
Variable Variation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Total Score overall 0.519 0.358 0.000 1.000
between 0.331 0.000 1.000
within 0.172 −0.364 1.166
Environment Score overall 0.526 0.349 0.000 1.000
between 0.318 0.000 1.000
within 0.182 −0.359 1.173
Social Score overall 0.506 0.358 0.000 1.000
between 0.334 0.000 1.000
within 0.168 −0.326 1.182
Governance Score overall 0.504 0.359 0.000 1.000
between 0.318 0.000 1.000
within 0.196 −0.341 1.239
Internal Score overall 0.428 0.370 0.000 1.000
between 0.333 0.000 1.000
within 0.192 −0.305 1.250
External Score overall 0.415 0.351 0.000 1.000
between 0.303 0.000 1.000
within 0.186 −0.467 1.194
Quick Ratio overall 0.409 1.399 0.000 21.195
between 1.044 0.000 9.140
within 0.876 −8.638 12.464
Tobin’s Q overall 1.599 0.949 0.547 9.949
between 1.300 0.678 9.949
within 0.261 0.407 3.302
Market value (£billions) overall 12.209 18.653 0.00167 132.745
between 16.868 0.00167 114.729
within 3.416 −11.978 35.154
Return on Equity (%) overall 33.876 266.166 −131.290 7206.450
between 128.221 −131.290 1365.863
within 231.809 −1195.717 5874.463
Union Density overall 0.178 0.265 0.000 1.000
between 0.229 0.000 1.000
within 0.121 −0.347 0.693
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TABLE 3: Fixed effects estimates of Internal CSR score
(1) (2) (3)
Internal CSR Internal CSR Internal CSR
Quick Ratio 0.0144∗∗ 0.0141∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗
(0.00424) (0.00419) (0.00413)
Tobin’s Q −0.0336 −0.0356 −0.0314
(0.0456) (0.0450) (0.0443)
Size (Market Value) −0.0649 −0.0592 −0.0661
(0.0547) (0.0539) (0.0585)
Return on Equity −0.00166∗∗∗ −0.00115∗∗ −0.000928
(0.000303) (0.000410) (0.000653)
Union Density 0.154+ 0.265
(0.0855) (0.262)
Union Density squared −0.141
(0.246)
Constant 1.049∗ 0.975∗ 1.022∗
(0.469) (0.461) (0.488)
Observations 1190 1190 1190
R2 within 0.019 0.026 0.027
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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TABLE 4: Fixed effects estimates of External CSR score
(1) (2) (3)
External CSR External CSR External CSR
Quick Ratio 0.00239 0.00240 0.000470
(0.00392) (0.00393) (0.00348)
Tobin’s Q −0.0103 −0.0102 −0.0259
(0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0309)
Size (Market Value) −0.0401 −0.0404 −0.0145
(0.0549) (0.0552) (0.0553)
Return on Equity 0.00443∗∗∗ 0.00440∗∗∗ 0.00356∗∗∗
(0.000519) (0.000600) (0.000759)
Union Density −0.00899 −0.426+
(0.0950) (0.233)
Union Density squared 0.530∗
(0.251)
Constant 0.781+ 0.785+ 0.611
(0.445) (0.450) (0.449)
Observations 1190 1190 1190
R2 within 0.010 0.010 0.025
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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TABLE 5: Fixed effects estimates of the difference between Internal and External CSR scores
(1) (2) (3)
Internal MINUS Internal MINUS Internal MINUS
External CSR External CSR External CSR
Quick Ratio 0.0120∗ 0.0117∗ 0.0142∗∗
(0.00555) (0.00561) (0.00515)
Tobin’s Q −0.0233 −0.0254 −0.00551
(0.0568) (0.0563) (0.0544)
Size (Market Value) −0.0248 −0.0188 −0.0516
(0.0661) (0.0670) (0.0689)
Return on Equity −0.00610∗∗∗ −0.00555∗∗∗ −0.00449∗∗∗
(0.000613) (0.000719) (0.000949)
Union Density 0.163 0.691∗
(0.118) (0.306)
Union Density squared −0.670∗
(0.304)
Constant 0.269 0.190 0.411
(0.556) (0.561) (0.564)
Observations 1190 1190 1190
R2 within 0.009 0.014 0.028
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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TABLE 6: Fixed effects estimates of the difference between Internal and External CSR scores on
Tobin’s Q
Tobin’s Q
Quick Ratio −0.0655∗∗∗
(0.00651)
Size (Market Value) 0.443∗∗∗
(0.121)
Internal MINUS External CSR −0.0337
(0.0603)
Return on Equity 0.00140+
(0.000771)
Union density 0.0520
(0.125)
Constant −2.049+
(1.036)
Observations 1190
R2 within 0.180
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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